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SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN VIRGINIA
THOMAS D. TERRY
Introduction
'While it is true that every simile limps, the motion for
summary judgment is not unlike the unveiling of a statue.
The motion requires the opposition to remove the shielding
cloak of formal allegations and demonstrate a genuine issue
as to a material fact.",
The above quotation succintly states the underlying
theory of the motion for summary judgment as conceived
and adopted in a number of American states today and em-
bodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The material
to follow will examine the historical reasons for the necessity
of the summary judgment reform with emphasis upon the
Virginia development and will attempt to compare Federal
Rule 56 with Virginia Rule 3:20 on summary judgment. The
purpose of the historical and comparative analysis is to arrive
at conclusions as to the effectiveness of the Virginia summary
judgment rule in achieving those goals which the procedure
is designed to reach.
Historical Background
Summary judgment as a procedural reform is the product
of two historical developments in the adjective law:
1. The dissatisfaction of the profession with the cumber-
some technicalities of the common law forms of action and
the injustice which often resulted from the strict requirements
of those rules.
2. The simplification of pleadings, in order to correct
the first situation above, resulted in the development of fact
directed pleadings as distinguished from the common law
requirement of an issue directed pleading system.
1 United States v. Dollar, 100 F. Supp. 881, 884 (D. Cal. 1951).
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The second historical influence, which sought to correct
the injustice of the first, brought with it new problems for
the modern procedural systems. Fact pleading, while pro-
viding a framework for counsel to generate the issues in the
case, did not force the issues as did the compelling methods of
common law pleading. Therefore, as facts provided elasticity
the pleader was not committed to a single theory of a cause
of action or defense and hence the pleader could effectively
cloud the issues and consequently could reach the trial stage
of litigation without a meritorious claim or defense. Indeed,
an important justification of fact pleading, as emphasized by
the early drafters of code systems, was that the litigant often
could not know what developments his evidence would pro-
duce and hence should not be committed in advance of
trial.2 As fact pleading developed in these jurisdictions it
became evident that the desirable flexibility often worked a
decided injustice on the adverse party. In some cases, the
trial revealed that viewed from the pleading stage no possible
turn of evidence could produce a victory for one party and
yet he was successful in carrying his adversary to trial. Sum-
mary judgment is one method of imposing a duty upon a party
to do more than simply allege a good cause of action or de-
fense. He must show that he is entitled to a trial on a genuine
issue of material fact, and materials other than pleadings
are used in support of the motion.
Virginia took an early lead in recognizing the injustices
produced by common law pleading and the authorities
generally agree that a statute passed in 1732 3 is the forerunner
to the motion for judgment procedure for commencing an
action at law.4 This statute, and several others passed before
1919, authorized the use of the motion for stating a claim in
several selected types of cases. In 1919, the motion for judg-
ment procedure was extended to all actions at law.5 It is
2 First Report, Commissioners on Practice and Pleading, New York, 1848, p. 144.
See Cark, Code Pleading (2nd ed., 1947) p. 225 for the attitude of the early code
authors on fact pleading.
3 Acts of May, 1732,4 Va. Stat. (Hening) 352, Chp. 10 and 8.
4 Chisholm v. Gilmer, 299 U. S. 99, 57 Sup. Ct. 65, 81 L. Ed. 63 (1936). Miller
Three American Ventures in Summary Civil Procedure, 38 Yale L. J. 193 (1928).
Clark and Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 Yale L. J. 423 (1929). Fowler,
Virginia Notice ofA! otion Procedure, 24 Va. L. R. 711 (1938).
5 Va. Code, (1919) sec. 6046.
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significant to note, that the use of this procedure was fre-
quently criticized by members of the bar at an early date, (
and the seeds of modern day opposition to summary proceed-
ings are apparent in their arguments. The holdings of the
Virginia courts were not uniform during the early stage of
this experiment in pleading reform,7 and the modern authorities
are not, as yet, in complete accord as to the real function of
the motion for judgment. 8 For purposes of the present dis-
cussion, however, it is sufficient to point out that the motion
for judgment procedure, as applied in the vast majority of
Virginia courts today, is the realization of the second historical
development mentioned above paving the way for the summary
judgment.
Another historical influence in the adoption of summary
judgment in Virginia is the simplified statutory procedure for
recovery on contracts. 9 The purpose of this section, as stated
in an early case, is:
"... to prevent delay caused to plaintiffs by con-
tinuances upon dilatory pleas when no real defenses
exist, and to simplify and shorten the proceedings." 10
Prior to the abolishment of the plea of the general issue,
this section denied defendant the opportunity of relying on a
merely formal general issue entered to delay the hearing.
The statute requires:
-... plaintiff file with his motion for judgment an
affidavit made by himself or his agent stating therein to the
6 John Marshall's argument in Graves v. Webb 1 Call 170 (1798), is an example of
this early opposition to the motion for judgment. Pendleton, J. summed up
Marshall's contention:
"... That if it was a declaration, the variance would be fatal; and, certainly,
it would not be pretended, that a notice, which was an innovation upon the
common law, might be less definite than a declaration; or, that the judg-
ment might vary from the declaration, in a suit at common law. That the
notice should state the claim with as much precision as a declaration..."
7 For a historical treatment of the cases during this period see Fowler, op. cit.
supra note 4.
8 Phelps, Handbook of Virginia Rules of Procedure in Actions at Law. (1959), p. 140.
9 Va. Code, (1950) sec. 8-511.
10 Gehl v. Baker, 121 Va. 23, 92 S. E. 852 (1917).
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best of the affiant's belief the amount of the plaintiff's
claim, that such amount is justly due and the time from
which plaintiff claims interest... "
If defendant does not file a counter affidavit with his
defense, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment for the amount
of his claim.
This statute is a direct application of the theory of summary
judgment in a restricted type of action, and is an example
of the type of provision which has led to the adoption of
summary judgment in any type of suit. Statutes of the same
tenor in other jurisdictions marked the beginnings of an
appreciation of the injustice which was done when a party was
allowed to prolong the inevitable judgment against him, and
interpose defenses merely for delay.11 Gradually, a tendency
appeared to increase the scope of the summary judgment
remedy, and the adoption of Federal Rule 56 which allowed
summary judgment in all civil actions is the modern pre-
decessor of the "all inclusive" type of procedure found in
many jurisdictions today. 12 The Virginia statute mentioned
above is particularly interesting in that affidavits are used to
insure that the defendant is not merely delaying the action.
On the other hand, Virginia Rule 3:2013 extending summary
judgment to include all types of actions makes no mention
of affidavits as one of the materials which may be considered
when the motion is deliberated by the court. Federal Rule 56
while not requiring a party to file an affidavit on moving for
summary judgment, makes such a practice permissive and, in
fact, the use of affidavits is an important phase of the Federal
Rule. This particular point will be examined in detail subse-
quently.
11 Early statutes providing for summary judgment on restricted types of claims
include: England-The Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act,
18 & 19 Vict. c. 67 (1855) (actions upon bills of exchange and promissory
notes).
New Jersey-N. J. Laws 1912, 380 (actions upon contracts, judgments for a
stated sum, and upon a statute).
Michigan-3 Mich. Comp. Laws (Cahill, 1915) c. 234, and sections 12581 and
12572. (contracts and judgments).
For a complete discussion of these and other statutory materials see Clark
and Samenow, op. cit. supra note 4.
12 Federal Rule 56 was originally enacted in 1937 and substantially amended in
1946.
13 Rule 3:20, Rule of Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, Va. Code, (1950).
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The adoption of 3:20 in the Rules of Court of 1950 com-
pleted the process of evolution of the summary judgment.
The Judicial Council for Virginia explained the operation of
the proposed rule as follows:
"The rule provides for summary judgment in those
cases that cannot be reached by demurrer in which the
only dispute concerns a pure question of law. It applies
only to cases in which no trial is necessary because no
evidence could affect the result. If, for example, at a
pretrial conference it appears that one party is relying
exclusively on evidence inadmissable under the parol
evidence rule, the judges decision on that point of law
would dispose of the case."14
In 1957 the rule was amended changing the wording from
"the admissions, if any, in a deposition" to "admissions, if
any, in the proceedings" and providing for summary judg-
ment on sustaining a motion to strike the evidence. This
amendment introduced in the Virginia Rule a possibility
which distinguished that rule from the accepted theory of
summary judgment elsewhere. In Virginia, it is possible to
move the court for summary judgment after the case has
reached the trial stage. This unique feature of the Virginia
Rule is discussed in the next section of this article.
A Comparison of the Virginia and Federal Rules on Summary
Judgment
The Virginia Summary Judgment Rule and the Federal Rule
differ in several important particulars. Since the Virginia
Rule is relatively new it is impossible to predict at this early
date to what extent the difference in terminology will actually
result in a difference in practical application. The Supreme
Court of Appeals had discussed Rule 3:20 on eight occasions,
and only one of these decisions followed the important 1957
amendment of the rule. In spite of this lack of primary
authority on which to base an analytical comparison of the
two rules there are some problems which are certain to arise
14 Judicial Council for Virginia, Proposed Modifications of Practice and Procedure
(1949), p. 29.
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due to the integration of summary judgment into the present
rules of practice in Virginia. The Federal Rules are a compre-
hensive expression of methods of modern pleading; the
Virginia Rules retain traditional ideas which are not based
upon the so-called modern "code" approach. 15 Since the two
procedural systems are, to a certain degree, different it is
logical that the adoption of the summary judgment rule in Vir-
ginia be geared to the background of Virginia procedure
and not the wholesale adoption of the letter of the Federal
Rules. The theoretical difficulty in maintaining such a position
is that the success of summary judgment in achieving those
ends which it is designed to achieve is closely related to the
existence of other "code" procedures of discovery, pretrial
practices, and related provisions similar to those in the Federal
Rules. To the extent that the basic assumptions underlying
the use of summary judgment are dependent upon procedures
which are not available in Virginia, the reason for the rule
fails and confusion is the result. The analysis which follows
seeks to examine the extent Virginia can hope to realize the
advantages of the summary judgment rule and still retain
certain traditional ideas of Virginia procedure. The two
rules are here set out in full for reference purposes:
Virginia Rule of the Supreme Court of Appeals (as
amended)
Rule 3:20 Summary Judgment
Either party may make a motion for summary judg-
ment at any time after the parties are at issue. If it
appears from the pleadings, the orders, if any, made at
a pretrial conference, the admissions, if any, in the pro-
ceedings, or, upon sustaining a motion to strike the
evidence, that the moving party is entitled to judgment,
the court shall enter judgment in his favor. Summary
judgment shall not be entered if the amount of damages
or any other material fact is genuinely in dispute.
15 Professor Charles Wright remarks:
"Virginia procedure, as thus prescribed, is an unsual mixture of old and new
concepts. The distinction between law and equity is preserved, though ad-
ministered by a single judge, and discovery, though possible, is quite
limited." Wright, Procedural Reform in the States, 24 F. R. D. 118 (1959).
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (as amended)
Rule 56 Summary Judgment
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a de-
daratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration
of 20 days from the commencement of the action or
after service of a motion for summary judgment by the
adverse party, move with or without supporting affi-
davits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or
any part thereof.
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a de-
claratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move
with or without supporting affidavits for a summary
judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion
shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for
the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hear-
ing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is en-
titled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered
on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine
issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If on
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and
by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain
what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good
faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order
specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount
of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and
1960]
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directing such further proceedings in the action as are
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified
shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be con-
ducted accordingly.
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony. Sup-
porting and opposing affidavits shall be made on per-
sonal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers
or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be
attached thereto or served therewith. The court may
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by
depositions or by further affidavits.
(f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable. Should it
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the
court may refuse the application for judgment or may
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained
or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or
may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it appear
to the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of
the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are pre-
sented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay,
the court shall forthwith order the party employing
them to pay to the other party the amount of the
reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits
caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's
fees, and any offending party or attorney may be
adjudged guilty of contempt.
A. Who May Make The Motion
Under both the Virginia Rule and the Federal Rule either
plaintiff or defendant may move for summary judgment. 16
16 See Virginia Rule 3:20, and Federal Rule 56(a) and (b), supra.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN VA.
B. When May The Motion Be Made
Virginia Rule 3:20 states that the motion may be made
"at any time after the parties are at issue." Under Virginia
Rule 3:12, the parties are at issue when the pleadings required
to be filed have been filed, or the time for filing them has
expired. This precludes consideration by the court of a
motion for summary judgment by either plaintiff or de-
fendant prior to the defendant's filing of his responsive
pleadings.17 Under Rule 3:5 defendant is allowed 21 days
after service upon him of the notice of motion for judgment
to file a responsive pleading, and under Rule 3:7 in the event
he enters a plea in abatement or demurrer which is subse-
quently overruled, the time may be longer., 8
Federal Rule 56(b) has always allowed defendant to make
his motion at any time after the institution of the action against
him. That is, he could file his motion before pleading to
plaintiff's claim.19 Defendant, therefore, is able to put in
issue the validity of plaintiff's claim immediately and in making
such a motion he is requesting an adjudication on the merits
rather than testing the technical sufficiency of plaintiff's
pleading alone. If defendant affirmatively demonstrates that
no material issue of fact exists and shows that he is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law, the court will enter summary
judgment in his favor.
Federal Rule 56(a) originally provided that plaintiff could
not file a motion for summary judgment until after defendant
filed his responsive pleading. However, largely through the
efforts of Judge Charles Clark, this section of the rule was
amended in 1946 and plaintiff was permitted to move for
summary judgment:
17 Carwile v. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 196 Va. 1, 82 S. E. 2d 588 (1954).
18 "When the court has entered its order overruling all pleas in abatement, de-
murrers and other pleas filed by a defendant, such defendant shall, unless he
has already done so, file his grounds of defense within such time as the court
may prescribe." Rule 3:7, Rule of Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, Va.
Code, (1950).
19 Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F. 2d 127, 1 A. L. R. 2d 370 (3rd Cir. 1947),
certiorari denied 334 U. S. 838, 68 Sup. Ct. 1495, 92 L. Ed. 1763 (1948).
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"at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion
for summary judgment by the adverse party".
By thus stating a time limitation in terms of days, the
defendant is given adequate time to prepare his course of
defense and yet pre-pleading motions which he may interpose
will not bar plaintiff from asserting his motion and offering
his material in support of it. Thus, Federal Rule 56 strikes
at the heart of all possible delaying tactics and, in doing so,
follows the spirit of summary judgment.
Returning to Virginia Rule 3:20, in the case where de-
fendant's demurrer is overruled and the court in the exercise
of its discretion permits defendant additional time to file his
grounds for defense, it is clear that formal objections tend to
postpone plaintiff's right to move for summary judgment.
Judge Clark criticized exactly this situation prior to the amend-
ment of the Federal Rules in his dissenting opinion in United
States v. Adler's Creamery:
"Under the circumstances no reason of substance
barred a final judgment below, and it is unfortunate
that mere limitations of procedure may have done so.
Amendment of Rule 56(a) eliminating this restriction
on the valuable remedy of the summary judgment ap-
pears to the writer hereof to be highly desirable in the
interest of preventing the protraction of litigation." 20
As a practical matter, the time which the court grants
defendant after overruling his demurrer before he must file
his grounds of defense may be a matter of only a few days.
In that situation, plaintiff's wait may not constitute any serious
burden upon him. The important point, however, is the
theoretical objection which Judge Clark emphasizes in the
Adler's Creamery case. Procedural delays are inconsistant with
the underlying theory of the summary judgment reform.
C. Materials Which May Be Used In Support Of The
Motion
20 United States v. Adler's Creamery, 107 F. 2d 987, 992 (2nd Cir. 1939).
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1. Pleadings. Both Virginia Rule 3:20 and Federal Rule
56(c) expressly mention pleadings as one of the materials
which the court will consider on the disposition of the sum-
mary judgment motion. Since pleadings, under both systems,
are designed to give the opposite party fair notice of the
nature of the claim or defense and summary judgment is an
adjudication on the merits, a consideration of pleadings alone
will normally not produce a summary judgment. Urnder the
Virginia Rules, the demurrer is the proper method of raising
the question of the legal sufficiency of the pleadings. 21 Under
the Federal Rules, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted22 is the proper method.
The distinction between these objections to the legal sufficiency
of pleadings and a motion for summary judgment on the
merits, is vital. Several of the few Virginia cases on summary
judgment expressly recognize this distinction. In Carwile v.
Richmond Newspapers,23 the court said:
"It will be observed that the motion for summary
judgment in the instant case is in many respects similar
to a demurrer; however when a demurrer is sustained
there is not necessarily a finality to the case since the
pleading may be amended, while sustaining a motion
for summary judgment is a final disposition of the
case."
As previously noticed, the Federal Rule permits defendant
to file his motion for summary judgment at any time after
the claim is filed. If the moving party bases his motion solely
on the basis of his opponent's pleading, his motion is actually
equivalent to a motion for judgment on the pleadings under
21 Anderson v. Patterson, 189 Va. 793, 55 S. E. 2d 1 (1949).
Burks, Pleading andPractice (Boyd 4th ed. 1952) sec. 208.
Phelps, op. cit. supra note 8, p. 184 ff
In Virginia, if the pleadings fail to inform the opposite party of the true
nature of the claim or defense in sufficient detail a motion for a bill of patti-
culars may be ordered. See Phelps, The Bill of Particulars in Virginia, 39 Va.
L. R. 989 (1953).
22 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b).
23 See note 17, supra.
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Federal Rule 12(c)24 or 12(b), a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be given. Rule 12(b)
as amended in 1946 covers the situation where the defendant
"tags" his motion as one for dismissal for failure to state a
claim, but succeeds in demonstrating that no genuine issue
of fact exists and hence qualifies for summary judgment:
"If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6)
to dismiss for failure of the pleadings to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the
court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion
by Rule 56."
Here, again, the Federal Rules do not allow an oppor-
tunity for a final judgment on the merits to escape due to the
wording of the motion by movant. This should be compared
with the situation which may well arise under the Virginia
Rules. There is no time limit as to the filing of a demurrer
in Virginia. 25 Therefore, after the parties are at issue a de-
murrer may be interposed at any time before the final de-
termination of the factual issues by court or jury. Applying
the theory of the Federal Rules, the court would be at liberty
to consider such a motion as a motion for summary judgment
and, upon a proper showing, award movant final judgment.
Is it necessary to specifically provide the court with this
alternative by amending the rules of court as has been done
in the Federal Rules? The answer is not available in Virginia,
today, and there was a conflict of authority in the Federal
24 "We find no merit in appellant's contention that the court should not have
entered 'judgments on the pleadings and a summary judgment at the same
time' . . . the better authority appears to hold that where a party presents both
a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion for summary judgment,
no distinction need be drawn between them, and the court is justified in
relying on all appropriate grounds disclosed by any or all papers of record in
the case." Pope v. Continental Insurance Co. of New York, 161 F. 2d 912,
915 (7th Cit. 1947) certiorari denied 332 U. S. 824, 68 Sup. Ct. 164, 92 L. Ed.
399 (1947).
25 Burke, op. cit. supra note 21, p. 339.
Phelps, op. cit. supra note 8, p. 185.
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courts prior to the amendment. 26 The arguments will center
around the old prohibitions against "speaking demurrers"
and the extent to which summary judgment is intrinsically, a
modification of this rule.
2. Pretrial Conference Orders-Partial Summary Judgment.
Under both Federal Rule 56 and Virginia Rule 3:20 if a pretrial
conference is held as provided for in Federal Rule 1-6 or Vir-
ginia Rule 4:1 and the results indicate there is no material
issue of fact, the party entitled to judgment as a matter of law
may be granted summary judgment without the necessity of a
trial. The pretrial conference is simply one means of dis-
covering that no issue of material fact exists and where the
pleadings tentatively indicate an issue of fact, the conference
may reveal that the issue is one of law only, making the case
ripe for summary judgment.27 Frequently, however, an
issue of material fact may exit as to a portion of a single claim
or as to one claim of several which a party advocates. For
example, the results of the pretrial conference may be that the
issue of liability in a negligence case is not genuinely in dispute
but the issue of damages is an issue of material fact which is
properly addressed to the trier of facts. In such cases, Federal
Rule 56(c) provides for partial summary adjudication of the
issue of liability while the last sentence of Virginia Rule 3:20
declares:
"Summary judgment shall not be entered if the
amount of damages or any other material fact is genuinely
in dispute."
This express denial of the concept of partial summary
judgment in the Virginia Rule is important whether or not a
pretrial conference is held but it is convenient to discuss the
principles involved under this section since one of the objects
of a pretrial conference is to determine what portion of the
case presents a real fact issue.
26 The following cases held the motion to dismiss was limited to matters appearing
on the face of the complaint: Kohler v.Jacobs, 138 F. 2d 440 (5th Cir., 1943).
United States v. Association of American Railroads, 4 F. R. D. 510 (D. Neb.
1945). Contra, holding that the motion to dismiss could be accompanied by
other materials: United States ex rel. Benjamin v. Hendrick, 52 F. Supp. 60
(S. D. N. Y. 1943). Samara v. United States, 129 F. 2d 594 (2d Cir. 1940).
27 Broderick Wood Products Co. v. United States, 195 F. 2d 433 (10th Cir. 1952).
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Federal Rule 56 does not refer to Federal Rule 16, on the
use of pretrial conferences. The reason for this absence of
specific reference is probably due to the desire of the drafters
of the Federal Rules to avoid confusion between the dis-
cretionary characteristics of Federal Rule 16, and the right of
a party to invoke the operation of Federal Rule 56 on summary
judgment. The use of a pretrial conference is discretionary
with the District Court,28 but in, order to "salvage some results
from the judicial effort involved in the denial of motion for
summary judgment"29 subsection (d) of Federal Rule 56
creates a duty on the District Court to
"... . if practicable ascertain what material facts exist
without substantial controversy and what material facts
are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear
without substantial controversy, including the extent to
which the amount of damages or other relief is not in
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in
the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the
trial shall be conducted accordingly."
Judge Clark points out that the net result of Federal Rule
56(d) and that of Federal Rule 16 is the same:
"(Federal Rule 56(d)) is in substance a pretrial order
of the same form as that provided for in the pretrial
rule, itself, Rule 16. This workable procedure demon-
strates how closely this rule is tied in spirit and in fact
to the other pretrial devices."30
The provisions of Federal Rule 56(d) are consistent with
the other sections of that Rule, which clearly provide for
summary judgment as to "all or any part"a1 of a claim. In
28 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 16.
3 Moore, Federal Practice (2nd ed. 1953) sec. 16.06.
29 Yale Transport Corp. v. Yellow Truck and Coach Manufacturing Company, 3
P.R. D. 440 (S. D. N. Y. 1944).
30 Clark, TheSummaryJudgment, 36Minn.L.R. 572.
31 See Federal Rule 56 (a), (b) and (c)
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other words, when a party moves for summary judgment
under Rule 56 he may demonstrate that certain factual issues
posed by his adversary are not genuine. Still, other factual
issues which must necessarily be determined in his favor be-
fore he is entitled to final judgment may be genuinely in
dispute. Under Rule 56, this party is entitled to a summary
adjudication of a portion of his claim, less than the whole
thereof, and the trial court is required to issue an order,
similar to an order resulting from a pretrial conference, stipu-
lating those factual issues which remain undetermined as a
result of the consideration of the motion for summary judg-
ment. The term "partial summary judgment" relates to this
process of elimination, and actually is not a final judgment
in the strict sense of the term. It has been suggested that
the term "partial summary adjudication" be used 32 to avoid
confusion between "a summary judgment, interlocutory in
character '33 and summary judgment which is res judicata
and subject to appeal. The trial court ietains control over its
interlocutory determination that as to a portion of the claim
no issue of material fact exists. In the ordinary case this
determination will become final upon the entry of final judg-
ment consistent with the verdict of the jury (or decision of the
court) on those issues of fact which are found to be genuinely
in dispute. There are cases, however, which demonstrate the
trial court may subsequently alter its interlocutory determi-
nation after a showing at trial that justice required that this
be done. In Coffman v. Federal Laboratories Inc., plaintiff
contended on appeal that a pretrial order under 56(d) had
the effect of res judicata and precluded reconsideration by
the trial court at a later stage of the litigation. In rejecting
this contention, the court said:
"Subsection (d) (of Rule 56) simply provides for a
method whereby the trial judge with the aid of counsel
can point up the controverted issues. It is, moreover,
similar to the pretrial procedure provided for in Rule 16
and the matters determined in the issues so framed are
not foreclosed in the sense that the judge cannot alter
his conclusions. The action of interpreting the orders,
32 6 Moore's, FederalPractice, (2nd ed. 1953) sec. 56.20.
33 This is the terminology used in Federal Rule 56(c).
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therefore, did not become final for the purposes of appeal
and it did not have the effect of a final judgment. The
court retained full power to make one complete
adjudication of all aspects of the case when the proper
time arrived. That time was when the judgment in the
whole proceeding was entered. Therefore, even if we
accept plaintiff's contention as to what was determined
by the motion the court was still free to alter its view
as to interpretation of the orders at a later stage of
the proceedings. Res judicata was not and is not
applicable." 34
Under the Virginia Rules, there can be no partial summary
adjudication, in the sense that is required under Federal Rule
56(d). If the trial court does not utilize the pretrial con-
ference provided for by Rule 4:1 all issues must go to trial,
and consequently, there is no advantage gained from the
judicial effort of considering and denying a motion for sum-
mary judgment on the whole of movant's case. The result
would seem to be that only in the most simple cases, where
movant can conclusively demonstrate that no genuine fact
issue can arise on any portion of the case, will the summary
judgment rule be of any value in Virginia. This deprives the
procedure of a great deal of its intrinsic value and may dis-
courage serious consideration of these motions by the trial
courts. Since movant is required to meet a strict standard in
showing that a genuine issue does not exist and all inferences
of fact offered by him at the hearing on the motion will be
drawn in favor of the party opposing the motion,3 5 his
motion may be given little more than a cursory examination.
Judge Clark feels that provisions for a partial adjudication is
a fundamental part of any effective summary judgment rule for
these reasons. 36
34 Coffman v. Federal Laboratories, Inc., 171 F. 2d 94, 98, (3rd Cir., 1948) certiorari
denied 336 U. S. 913, 69 Sup. Ct. 603, 93 L. Ed. 1076.
35 The Federal courts have frequently referred to movant's burden on a motion for
summary judgment in these terms. See for example: Pogue v. Great Atlantic
and Pacific Tea Co., 242 F. 2d 575 (5th Cir. 1957).
Griffith v. Utah Power and Light Company, 226 F. 2d 661 (9th Cir. 1955).
Cochran v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 362 (D. Conn., 1954).
And see the Virginia statement of the rule in Sanford v. Mosier,-Va.-, 111
S.E. 2d 283 (1959)
36 Clark, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 562.
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The Virginia Rule does prohibit a trial court pretrying a
case when it is not its policy to utilize the pretrial conference 37
and this is probably the most that can be said for the absence
of any provision for partial summary judgment similar to
Federal Rule 56(d). If the trial court does inaugurate a pre-
trial system, an order conforming to the outline specified in
Rule 4:1 will achieve the same results as a partial summary
adjudication of the case. However, the extent to which the
trial courts and the Bar will subscribe to the pretrial system
in the future is doubtful in the face of Virginia's long standing
endorsement of the strict "adversary system" of the practice
of law. 3 8
3. Evidentiary Materials. Federal Rule 56 (c) enumerates
several classes of evidentiary materials which may be con-
sidered by the trial court in passing upon a motion for summary
judgment: depositions, admissions on file, and affidavits.
In addition to those classes specifically provided for in 56 (c),
interrogatories and answers under Federal Rule 3339 and
other materials that would be admissable in evidence or other-
wise usable at trial have been held to be proper materials
for consideration upon a motion for summary judgment.4o
The purpose in including these materials within the scope
of the motion is to provide movant with a means of demon-
strating that issues apparent on the face of the pleadings are
not genuine issues of fact at all by affirmatively showing that
he can produce certain evidence on trial. This aspect of
Federal Rule 56 has resulted in considerable controversy.
The following quotations from the authorities indicate the
area of disagreement:
"'The purpose of the rule is to enable District
Courts through frank and complete disclosure by all
parties to determine what, if any, issues of fact there may
37 6 Moore, op. cit. supra note 32, sec. 56.20(3).
38 For an example of the types of arguments against the use of pretrial procedures,
see Kuykendall, Pretrial Conference: A Dissent from the Bar, 45 Va. L. R.147
(1959).
39 Ulen v. American Airlines, 7 F. R. D. 371 (D. D. C., 1947).
40 For a listing of materials which fall under this dassification see 6 Moore, op.
cit. supra note 32, sec. 56.11(1).
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be for a jury to determine, and one party may not on
motion for summary judgment withhold proof which he
intends to use on trial."41
The author of a leading treatise on Federal Procedure
comments on the above decision:
.. . it is sometimes held that on a motion for
summary judgment both parties should fully disclose
what the evidence will be on the issue involved, and a
party may not withhold evidence which he intends to
use at the trial. It seems doubtful, however, whether
the parties need go quite that far. It should be enough
to disclose merely sufficient evidence by affidavits or by
use of discovery methods to demonstrate that there is
a material issue of fact to be submitted for decision by
the trier of facts." 42
Judge Frank of the Second Circuit, dissenting in a 1945
case expressed his view as follows:
"The gravamen of this theory of summary judgment
is that to resist the motion a party need not produce
his evidence, but need only indicate that it is possible
that such evidence may be available." 43
Judge Clark speaking for the majority in the same case
said:
"Here the analogy suggested ... of evidence which
'would require a directed verdict for the moving party'
is useful. But care should be taken to make the analogy
as exact as the circumstances permit; the ruling is to be
made on the record the parties have actually presented,
not on one potentially possible. Hence the case here is
as though plaintiff had then rested, with no contra-
41 Simmons v. Charbonnier, 56 F. Supp. 512 (D. C. Ga. 1944).
42 3 Barron and Holtzoff, FederalPractice and Procedure, (1951) p. 141.
43 Madeirense Do Brasil, S/A v. Srulman-Emrick Lumber Co., 147 F. 2d 399 (2d
Cir. 1945) certriorari denied 325 U. S. 861, 65 Sup. Ct. 1201, 89 L. Ed. 1982
(1945) noted in 45 Col. L. R. 946 (1945).
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diction or rebuttal of any kind, and had made its own
motion for a directed verdict or preemptory instruc-
tion."44
These competing views struggle with a basic problem
and Judge Clark, is the leading exponent of the minority
view. He has championed summary judgment from its in-
ception and in the procedure field no single name carries
more respect. It remains to be seen whether he will succeed
in establishing his view in the Federal courts.
Of the materials mentioned above, the use of ex parte
affidavits to demonstrate the absence of an issue of fact is
the least effective method. Since the affiant is not subject to
cross examination and his demeanor is not observable by the
trier of facts, the objection that affiant's credibility is not
properly tested is often raised.4 Affidavits submitted under
Rule 56 are required, however, to meet the requirements of
facts which would be admissible in evidence if offered at trial
and be based upon personal knowledge.46 Subsections (f)
and (g) of Federal Rule 56 further provide for the situation
where the party opposing the motion, for a sufficient reason,
is unable to present by affidavits, facts to justify his opposition
to the motion and for affidavits submitted in bad faith. In
cases where no issue of credibility is involved, and that is
conclusively demonstrated to the satisfaction of the trial
court, affidavits can be the sole material upon which the
motion for summary judgment is granted. The party op-
posing the motion for summary judgment is not entitled to
hold back his evidence until trial hoping for developments
which will generate an issue of fact.47 He is required to come
forward with something of probative value to meet the affi-
davits offered by movant.4 s To allow the party opposing
the motion to refuse to do less and still allow him to reach
trial would be to emasculate the summary judgment rule.
44 Madeirense Do Brasil, S/A v. Stulman-Emrick Lumber Co., op. cit. supra note
43, 405.
45 Bowers v. E.J. Rose Mfg. Co., 149 F. 2d 612 (9th Cir., 1945).
46 Federal Rule 56(e).
47 Orvis v. Brickman, 196 F. 2d 762 (C. D. C. 1952).
Surkin v. Chateris, 197 F. 2d 77 (5th Cir., 1952).
48 Unless, of course, the provisions of Federal Rule 56(e) and (f) apply.
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Depositions, on the other hand, provide a better means for
movant to justify his motion for summary judgment since the
deponent is subject to cross examination. 49 But, like affidavits,
the court is still unable to observe the deameanor of the de-
ponent. 50 It was in a case where defendant insurer sought to
use depositions in invoking summary judgment that Judge
Clark made a classic reference to the summary judgment rule:
"(If plaintiff) may thus reserve one's evidence when
faced with a motion for summary judgment there would
be little opportunity to 'pierce the allegations of fact in
the pleadings' or to determine that the issues formally
raised were in fact sham or otherwise unsubstantial. It is
hard to see why a litigant could not then generally avail
himself of the means of delaying presentation of his case
until the trial. So easy a method of rendering useless the
very valuable remedy of summary judgment is not
suggested in any part of its history or in any one of the
applicable decisions." 5,
Admissions are obviously a valuable material for use in
deciding a motion for summary judgment. Federal Rule 36 is a
distinct aid in procuring admissions from the adverse party and
will often materially aid movant and the court with reference
to a motion under Rule 56.52 Again, however, it is important
not to enter the bailiwick of the trier of facts and regard a per-
missive inference, which is available to the trier of facts, as an
admission. 5 3
The evidentiary materials described above is another
example of the efforts of the drafters of the Federal Rules to
insist upon a genuine issue of fact existing before going to trial.
4 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 30.
50 6 Moore, op. cit. supra note 32, sec. 56.11(4).
51 Engl v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 139 F. 2d 469, 471 (2d Cir., 1943).
52 Federal Rule 36, reads in part:
"(a) Request for admission. After commencement of an action a party may
serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter
of the genuineness of any relevant documents described in and exhibited
with the request or of the truth of any relevant matters of fact set forth in the
request ...
53 See Madeirense Do Brasil, S/A v. Stulman-Emrick Lumber Co., op. cit. supra
note 43.
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Counsel is not permitted to conceal or avoid issues which will
require consideration by the trier of facts. The purpose of sum-
mary judgment is well expressed when these rules are correctly
applied and there is dearly no infringment of the right to trial
by jury when there is no fact issue to be decided. r 4
The Virginia Summary Judgment Rule avoids specific
reference to such evidentiary materials as have been discussed in
connection with the Federal Rule. In fact, the only materials
which seem to be available under Virginia Rule 3:20 before
actual entry into the trial stage are the pleadings and pretrial
conference orders, previously discussed, and "the admissions,
if any, in the proceedings". This seems to indicate that Virginia
does not subscribe to the use of such evidentiary materials
before trial for the purposes of deciding a motion for summary
judgment in the absense of a pretrial conference. This course is
not inconsistent with long established Virginia ideas on the
importance of the adversary system of administering the law,-5
and the conclusion is unavoidable that the drafters of the rules
intended to eliminate these materials completely from the
operation of the summary judgment rule. This, perhaps more
than any other single feature of Rule 3:20 violates the spirit of
the summary judgment procedural reform. If the court is
required to pass upon a motion for summary judgment without
benefit of indications as to what is susceptible of proof at the
trial, movants burden of dearly showing no genuine fact issue
-4 The Court of Appeals of New York upheld the constitutionality of the New
York summary judgment statute in General Investment Co. v. Interborough
Rapid Transit Co., 235 N. Y. 133,139 N. E. 216 (1923).
Also see Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland v. United States 187 U. S. 315,
23 Sup. Ct. 120, 47 L. Ed. 194 (1902) upholding the constitutionality of a
summary judgment rule in the District Court for the District of Columbia.
55 Professor Phelps, suggests that:
"The direct use of summary judgment for the obvious purpose of discovery
would probably not be permitted by the courts in Virginia." op. cit. supra
note 8, p. 257.
It is interesting to note, in this connection, than an early commentary on the
Rules of the Supreme Court of 1950 dealing with the discovery process in
Virginia anticipated a desirable interrelationship between summary judgment
and the discovery rule based upon federal precedents:
"Of the adopted rules of practice and procedure, Rule 3:20 provides a
potential source of discovery aid in the form of summary judgment. This
procedure, testing the genuineness of issue, forces the parry against whom
it is requested to produce sufficient proof to demonstrate that there is a
genuine dispute. This will in most instances enable the petitioning party
to obtain a clearer understanding of his opponent's case." Chappell, The
Discovery Processin Virginia, 37 Va. L.R. 151, 160 (1951).
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exists will often be impossible of achievement. The court will
be forced to assume that the party opposing the motion can
demonstrate all fact issues that are possible under the pleadings,
unless a pretrial conference is held or an admission is obtained.
As noted earlier a Virginia statute provides for summary
judgment on accounts and contracts 56 and expressly provides
for the use of affidavits in connection with a claim under the
statute. The Supreme Court of Appeals has said of this section
of the Code:
"This section was intended to prevent delay caused
to plaintiff's by continuances upon dilatory pleas when
no real defenses exist, and to simplify and shorten the
proceedings.".57
This endorsement of the basic theory of the use of affidavits
to achieve the goals of the summary judgment is, at least, a
recognition of the value of such a procedure in a limited
group of claims. Here, the object is to require defendant to
present some indication that he has a meritorious defense. If no
defensive pleading and affidavit is filed by the defendant, the
plaintiff, on motion made in open court, shall be entitled to
judgment for the amount claimed in the affidavit and no further
proof of the plaintiff's claim is necessary. 58 Such a provision
when limited to simple accounts and contracts certainly re-
quires truth in the pleadings. 09 Note that the statute creates an
affirmative duty on defendant to come forward with more than
his pleadings in order to gain a trial. He must respond to the
merits of the controversy without delay and plaintiff's right in
these contract actions is thereby extended to include the right to
proceed without such delays. Under the Federal Rule this right
is basic to summary judgment in all types of actions. Under
Virginia Rule 3:20 plaintiff's right is not deemed of sufficient
value to outweigh the necessity of requiring defendant to pre-
sent evidence before trial.
56 Va. Code, (1950) sec. 8-511.
57 Carpenter v. Gray, 113 Va. 518, 75 S. E. 300 (1912).
58 Va. Code, (1950) sec. 8-511.
59 Courts have frequently recognized inherent powers to strike sham and frivolous
pleadings. See Clark op. cit. supra note 2, p. 254.
Also for rules of court expressing this power, see Rule 1:12, Rules of Supreme
Court of.Appeals of Virginia, Va. Code, (1950).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11.
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D. The Granting of Summary Judgment on Sustaining a
Motion to Strike the Evidence
Virginia Rule 3:20 provides that the court "upon sustaining
a motion to strike the evidence" may enter summary judgment
for the movant. This provision in the rule is, perhaps, the most
interesting and distinctive phase of the Virginia Rule and it
represents a departure from the general accepted utilization of
summary judgment in other jurisdictions. The ordinary
justification for summary judgment is to relieve the litigant
of the burden of going to trial when there is no issue of fact
to be decided by the trier of facts.o 0 The statement of the
Virginia Rule given above contemplates the use of summary
judgment upon the trial stage of the litigation and hence would
seem to ignore the basic summary judgment theory. The key
to this situation is to be found in the general development of
the Virginia law on the motion to strike and the decision in a
recent case decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals. By way
of anticipating the material to follow, the use of summary
judgment at the trial stage is not a flagrant departure from ac-
cepted theories of the adjective law. This is so because of the
theoretical similarities between summary judgment and the
direction of a verdict after the introduction of evidence at the
trial. In both cases, no issue of fact is presented which must be
determined by the trier of facts and hence, as a matter of law,
one party is entitled to judgment.
Prior to a 1957 amendment, a Virginia statute prohibited a
directed verdict.6 1 This statutory denial of a practice which is
employed in the great majority of states today and in the Federal
Courts, 6 2accounts for the use of the motion to strike out the
evidence in Virginia. The possibility of using the motion to
strike in cases where a different verdict could not have been
properly rendered by the jury, was recognized at an early date. 63
60 "The very object of a motion for summary judgment is to separate what is
formal, or pretended in denial or averment from what is genuine and sub-
stantial so that only the latter may subject a suitor to the burden of a trial."
Cardozo, J. in Richard v. Credit Suisse 242 N. Y. 346. Also see Whelan v.
New Mexico Oil and Gas Co., 226 F. 2d. 156 (10th Cit., 1955).
61 Va. Code (1950) sec. 8-218.
62 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 50.
63 For a concise history of the development of the motion to strike out the evi-
dence, see Burke, op. cit. supra note 21, sec. 284.
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Thereafter (although it was frequently argued the practice vio-
lated the spirit of the statute prohibiting a directed verdict), 64
the motion to strike grew in popularity with the members of the
bar and was accepted by the courts. The motion to strike was
found to be less demanding administratively to the movant than
the common law demurrer to the evidence and, most impor-
tantly, the courts held that unlike the demurrer to the evidence,
movant did not lose his right to the jury if his motion failed. 65
After the adoption of the summary judgment rule in 1950,
a case arose before the Supreme Court of Appeals which
resulted in the amendment of the rule in 1957, and involved the
motion to strike. oo Plaintiff sought to recover for personal in-
juries sustained in an accident involving her automobile and
another operated by defendant wife with defendant husband
riding therein as a passenger. Plaintiff sought relief as against
both husband and wife, arguing a principal-agent relationship
existed and hence the husband must respond for the alleged
negligence of the wife. At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence
defendant husband moved to strike on grounds that plaintiff
had presented no evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict
on the agency issue. The court sustained defendant husband's
motion but the jury verdict made no mention of the husband,
returning a verdict for the wife on the issue of negligence and
certain other claims presented to them. On appeal, plaintiff
argued that under the doctrine developed in Heath v. Mooers67
there was no basis for the trial court's entry of judgment for
defendant husband, there being no jury verdict to support the
judgment. The Supreme Court of Appeals was thus faced with
the possibility of requiring defendant to endure prolonged liti-
gation involving additional expense in a case where defendant
was clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. In Heath v.
Mooers the court had held that the granting of the motion to
strike did not dispense with the necessity of the jury verdict as
the judgment of the court could not be substituted for that of
the jury in the absence of waiver. Defendant husband's counsel
64 Barksdale v. Southern Railway Co., 152 Va. 604, 148 S. E. 683 (1929). Note, 17
Va. L. R. 299 (1931).
65 Burke, op. cit. supra note 21, sec. 284.
6r Clark v. Kimnach, 198 Va. 737, 96 S. E. 2d 780 (1957).
67 Heath v. Mooers, 171 Va. 397, 199 S. E. 519 (1938).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN VA.
provided the court with the mechanism for avoiding the impli-
cations of this result. Virginia Rule 3:20 had changed the law in
this respect argued counsel, for the parties were "at issue" and
there were no genuine issue of material fact in dispute. There-
fore, the court below properly interpreted defendant's motion
to strike as a motion for summary judgment and under Rule
3:20 was empowered to enter judgment in defendant's favor
without the rendition of a jury verdict.
In 1957, the summary judgment rule was amended to ex-
pressly endorse the theory of this case, and summary judgment
became a means for producing reform in the Virginia procedural
system in a unique manner. Summary judgment as applied in
other procedural systems is merely a means of avoiding the
necessity of convening the trial where the court would be
required to direct a verdict if the litigation should reach that
stage. In Virginia the summary judgment rule itself was used to
combat the necessity of a jury verdict when no genuine issue of
fact is presented. This "cart before the horse" situation may be
a lesson worth serious consideration for advocates of sweeping
changes in Virginia procedure. If direct attacks upon vested
ideas produce no results, the introduction of piecemeal reform
may have a cumulative effect. At least, the expressions of the
courts will generate discussions and arguments involving the
reasons for these reforms and this is worth something.
The similarity between the tests upon the motion for sum-
mary judgment and the motion for a directed verdict has been
recognized by the Federal courts, Professor Moore, after noting
that the time for the two motions are different under the Federal
Rules says:
"But functionally the theory underlying a motion for
summary judgment is essentially the same as the theory
underlying a motion for a directed verdict. The crux of
both theories is that there is no genuine issue of material
fact to be determined by the trier of facts, and that on the
law applicable to the established facts the movant is
entided to judgment." o s
68 6 Moore, op. cit. supra note 32, sec. 56.02 (10).
Also see: Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U. S. 620, 64 Sup. Ct. 724,
88 L. Ed. 967 (1944).
Meyers v. District of Columbia, 17 F. R. D. 216 (D. D. C., 1955).
Appolonio v. Baxter, 217 F. 2d 267 (6th Cir., 1954).
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Although a few cases have chosen to emphasize the difference
between determining whether an issue of fact exists before the
introduction of evidence and the "determination" of an issue of
fact after the introduction evidence, 69 this would seem to go
only to the materials available to the court in deciding whether
an issue of law, only, is involved. Under the Federal Rule the
anticipation of evidence through the use of affidavits and other
evidentiary materials would seem to nullify any basic theoretical
distinction between the two procedures. Is there, then, any
disadvantage in the use of summary judgment in connection
with the motion to strike in Virginia to achieve the results of a
directed verdict? Certainly, the terminology will cause some
confusion. As the summary judgment rule is exercised, counsel
will search for precedents in connection with Federal Rule 56
and similar rules in other jurisdictions. In the absence of an
understanding of the development of the Virginia law on the
motion to strike, it will be difficult to reconcile the essential
pretrial nature of these discussions with a motion which is an
important trial weapon in Virginia. Also, any tendency to ex-
tend the summary judgment rule in Virginia to include the use
of evidentiary materials as a pretrial device would seem to be
discouraged by a provision for summary judgment at the trial.
If the procedure is available to movant before the case goes to
the jury, the real purpose of avoiding an unnecessary trial be-
comes intermingled with the idea of an unnecessary verdict and
the distinct advantages of each are blurred. The result may be
that no further attempts to improve the rule in achieving its
basic purpose are seriously attempted.
In 1958, the Virginia statute referred to above prohibiting
the direction of a verdict was amended and now permits the
trial judge, who has sustained a motion to strike the evidence
for either plaintiff or defendant, to direct the jury's verdict in ac-
cordance with his ruling on the motion to strike. 70 It has been
suggested that this amendment was designed to meet the in-
frequent case where plantiff has prevailed on his motion to
strike and the issue of damages is still genuinely in dispute
89 Kirkpatrick v. Consolidated Underwriters, 227 F. 2d 228 (Sth Cir., 1955).
Rowland er al. v. Miller's Adm'r, Ky., 307 S. W. 2d 3 (1956).
Farrall v. District of Columbia Amateur Ath. Union, 153 F. 2d 647 (D. D. C.,
1946).
70 Va. Code (Supp. 1958), sec. 8-218.
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thus eliminating the use of summary judgment in the manner
outlined above. 73 But, the amendment is expressly applicable
to defendant's motion as well so there is no longer any real
justification for the continued use of summary judgment as
applicable upon the granting of the motion to strike. There-
fore, summary judgment should be returned to its proper con-
text where it is more likely to receive recognition as a procedure
eliminating the necessity for trial. As a matter of fact, if no
other changes in the rule can be effectively advocated, a return
to the wording existing before the 1957 amendment would
seem to be a desirable interim step.
Conclusion
Virginia Rule 3:20 is an extremely limited version of the
concept of summary judgment. Thus far, the success of the
rule in achieving procedural reform has, surprisingly enough,
been in the trial stage of litigation. Although this result was
desirable, the confusion of summary judgment with the
favorable aspects of permitting a court to direct a verdict has
resulted in a mistaken emphasis as to the purpose of summary
judgment. The use of the procedure in connection with the
granting of a motion to strike tends to distract from its real
purpose, that of eliminating a trial in the absence of an issue of
material fact. If the rule is recognized as method of achieving
this goal, it should become dear that the absence of provisions
for partial summary adjudication of a portion less than the
whole of plaintiff's claim and the denial of the discovery aspect
of the present Virginia rule are detrimental to any effective
utilization of summary judgment in Virginia. When it becomes
clear that the rule is not accomplishing its primary reason for
existence, the bench and the bar will be required to reflect upon
the traditional Virginia procedural blockades preventing the
wholesale endorsement of modern code systems. The alter-
natives involved will take definite shape and the choice of a
strict adversary system of administering the law will be seen
to involve a definite price.
Federal Rule 56 is an intriguing example of a successful
method of reaping the possible benefits of summary judgment.
71 Boyd, Annual Survey of Virginia Law, Pleading and Practice, 44 Va. L. R. 1388
(1958).
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It is submitted that no better long-term goal exists than the
eventual complete adoption of that rule in Virginia. However,
before this is conceivable, some long existing values must be
put to rest. The problem must be recognized first, as suggested
above. For the present, then, it is recommended that the rule
be amended to read as it did when originally adopted in 1950
with the hope that the future brings a clear understanding of its
purpose.
